Abstract: In order to develop a safety management mechanism applicable to features of construction industry, game theory was used to study the opposition and unity of the interest of all parties in the process of construction safety management. Relationship between supervision institutions, construction companies, and construction workers was thoroughly analyzed, and two-party and three-party game models between them were constructed. Secondly, pure strategy and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution methods were adopted to obtain a quantitative restriction relationship between interest of the three sides. Then, game analysis was conducted between construction enterprises and supervision institutions, construction enterprises and the construction workers, and between these parties respectively. Finally, suggestions for improvement of construction safety management mechanism were put forward based on the analysis. The results show that workers will choose to operate in accordance with regulations if punishment for violations are intensified or benefits and rewards for compliance are increased. By reducing cost of safety management, and increasing penalties for companies not implementing safety strategies and the handling cost for accidents, it can encourage enterprises to implement safety strategy. And supervision institutions will also choose to execute supervision strategy if its cost to supervise is reduced and that for illegal conducts is increased.

Key words: game analysis, construction safety management mechanism, mixed strategy, Nash equilibrium, incentive compatibility